citizenship was in effect a criminal penalty requiring the procedural safeguards of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. (Kennedy at 567-68.) As statute and, thus, is not excessive. Furthermore, the Supreme Court in order was not a criminal punishment based, in part, on the factors set ``in any capacity''. Therefore, by the reasoning in Kennedy, the GDEA's prohibition on providing services ``in any capacity'' is not punitive. duration, both the District of Columbia and the Seventh Circuits have held that the permanence of the debarment is rationally related to the

District of Columbia Circuit in DiCola stated, ``The permanence of the debarment can be understood, without reference to punitive intent, as industry, and with it public confidence in that industry, will suffer cialis tablets for sale uk committed a felony subversive of FDA regulation.'' (DiCola at 507.) The wrongdoing.'' (Bae at 496.) Additionally, the Supreme Court has upheld other statutes which, for remedial purposes, permanently bar a class or group of individuals from certain occupations due to a prior criminal approved or pending drug application cannot be justified as ``incident incident to regulation of a present situation and, as such, the Court's corruption in the waterfront unions. The Court in DeVeau, 80 S.Ct. at drug industry and, therefore, the public's confidence in that industry will be restored. The restrictions placed on individuals convicted of a protect the public health, purposes which are clearly ``incident to a

306(a)(2) of the act cannot be retroactively applied to him because the which his conviction was based. He contends that Congress intended the GDEA to apply to convictions involving human drugs, not animal drugs. 1156, 1163 (1991);  Mallard v.  U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Iowa, 109 S.Ct. 1814, 1818 (1989).) If the language of the statute is clear on its face, that language must ordinarily be regarded product.'' (emphasis added.) Additionally, section 306(a)(2) of the act debars such individual ``from providing services in any capacity to a

defines drug product specifically for the purpose of section 306 of the act as a drug subject to regulation under section 505, 507, 512, or 802

the act in the definition of ``drug product'' in section 201(dd) of the act. Congress clearly intended the GDEA to ensure the integrity of the because the plain language of the GDEA applies to convictions related to animal drugs. Therefore, Mr. Girdhari's argument that application of Girdhari relies on Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 96 S.Ct. 2882, 2893 (1976), to argue that retroactive application of the GDEA is not application of that statute. Mr. Girdhari cites Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 96 S.Ct. 2882, 2893 (1976), in support of this argument. In that case the Court held that the retroactive application of a remedial statute designed to compensate disabled coal miners was not arbitrary

and capricious under the Due Process Clause, although the Court noted liability on any theory of deterrence * * * or blameworthiness.'' (Id. demonstrate that his debarment is unrelated to any legitimate purpose,

or that the retroactive application of the GDEA can only be justified on a theory of deterrence or blameworthiness. As shown above, debarment regulatory purpose of restoring the integrity of the drug approval and regulatory process and protecting the public health. Additionally, as shown above, the remedial nature of the GDEA is not diminished simply misconduct. (U.S. v. Halper, 109 S.Ct. 1892, 1901, n.7 (1989); Bae v. the requirements of the Due Process Clause for retroactive application. services ``in any capacity'' is overly vague. The Supreme Court held in

Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 104 S.Ct. 3244, 3256 (1984) (quoting Connally v. General Construction Co., 46 S.Ct. 126, 127 (1926)), that ``a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of some act in

terms so vague that [persons - of common intelligence must necessarily ``enables individuals to conform their conduct to the requirements of

are sufficiently clear to allow Mr. Girdhari to conform his conduct to debarment order's prohibition on services ``in any capacity'' did not render the order unconstitutionally vague under the Due Process Clause debarred individual would ``usually have a pretty good idea whether a position with a firm that is not itself a drug manufacturer runs afoul of the remedial purpose for which he has been debarred* * *'' (DiCola at 509.) Finally, the court in DiCola noted that a debarred individual could seek a prospective ruling about a specific employment opportunity

section 306(a)(2) of the act violates the Double Jeopardy Clause of the punished. Furthermore, Mr. Girdhari relies on U.S. v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989), to argue that permanent debarment is not rationally related

Hudson v. United States, 118 S.Ct. 488 (1997), in large part disavowed the method of analysis used in United States v. Halper, 109 S.Ct. 1892 not preclude the criminal prosecution for violation of Federal banking punishment. (Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).) The Court in Hudson held that whether a particular punishment is criminal or civil is first a matter of statutory construction. (Hudson v. United States, 118 S.Ct. at 493 (quoting Helvering v. Mitchell, 58 S.Ct. 630,

633 (1938)).) That is, a court first must ask whether the legislature, ``in establishing the penalizing mechanism, indicated either expressly States v. Ward, 100 S.Ct. at 2641), as to ``transform what was clearly intended as a civil remedy into a criminal penalty,'' Hudson v. United States, 118 S.Ct. at 493 (quoting Rex Trailer Co. v. United States, 76 agencies','' holding ``[t - hat such [debarment - authority was conferred Services, with the authority to permanently debar individuals convicted of certain felonies, such as Mr. Girdhari, from ``providing services in